Corporate Governance, Information, and Investor Confidence by Kumar, Praveen & Zattoni, Alessandro
1 
 
Corporate Governance, Information, and Investor Confidence 
 
Praveen Kumar & Alessandro Zattoni 
 
Corporate governance has a major impact on investors’ confidence that self-interested 
managers and controlling shareholders will not divert their investment to non-productive ends 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Claessens, 2002). Maintaining this confidence is critical for public 
firms because the resources and capital provided by outside investors is the life-blood of their  
growth and even survival. In their seminal work on the modern corporation, Berle and Means 
(1932) pointed out the disadvantaged situation of outside investors. In particular, shareholders in 
corporations do not have the expertise and/or the resources to monitor individually insiders’ actions 
or access insiders’ information on the future prospects of the firms. Building on this, the vast and 
influential literature on agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) highlights the consequences of 
asymmetric information between insiders and investors. More broadly, there are large literatures on 
ameliorating agency conflicts through incentive contracts (Hart, 1995) and the transmission of 
information by insiders to outside investors through signaling with dividends and share repurchases 
(Bhattacharya, 1979; Vermaelen, 1981) and disclosure through financial statements (Dye, 2001). 
However, the role of corporate governance is considered only implicitly in these papers.  
Research on the explicit effects of corporate governance on insiders’ moral hazard and 
information transmission is only now emerging. In particular, we have looked for research that 
examines the interaction of the quality of corporate governance with empirically important aspects 
of insiders’ behavior and information transmission choices. Moreover, there has been a need to 
study this role of corporate governance in diverse international contexts. The studies published in 
this issue of CGIR move the literature significantly forward in these areas. 
As we mentioned above, a major concern for outside investors is that resources can be 
diverted by managers for perquisite consumption (Grossman & Hart 1988), or tunneled by 
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controlling shareholders for their pecuniary benefit (Johnson et al., 2000;  Cheung et al., 2006). In 
particular, the risk of tunneling has received substantial attention in the recent literature (Aslan and 
Kumar, 2012, 2014; Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012; Shan, 2013). The fast growing literature on 
tunneling has examined both theoretically and empirically the consequences of tunneling for both 
minority shareholders and creditors. However, the role of management in tunneling by controlling 
shareholders has received little attention. This is a significant gap in the literature. After all, the 
agency literature is largely devoted to understanding the implications of the managerial power and 
prerogatives. In the first paper of this issue, Zhang et al. study controlling shareholder-manager 
collusion in tunneling, using data from Chinese listed companies. Zhang et al. find support for the 
hypothesis that there is collusion between controlling shareholders and managers. While the earlier 
literature shows that the deviation between control and cash flow rights of dominant shareholders 
facilitates tunneling, this study shows that this deviation is negatively related to the pay- and 
turnover-performance sensitivity of managers. This is one of the first empirical analyses of the 
relation of controlling shareholder moral hazard (as measured by the deviation between control and 
cash flow rights) and managerial incentives. They also find evidence of rent sharing between 
controlling shareholders and management, suggesting that the collusion between them has negative 
consequences for investors beyond the weakening of managerial performance incentives. 
Furthermore, Zhang and et al. use their data to examine the variations in the controlling 
shareholder-manager nexus. They find that this nexus, resulting in weak performance incentives, is 
more pronounced in firms with lower profits and poorer economic prospects. This is an especially 
interesting result because it suggests a form of ‘vicious cycle,’ whereby collusion between 
controlling shareholders and management leads to poor economic performance that further 
exacerbates the incentives for rent sharing (through tunneling and otherwise depleting the resources 
of the firm). Analyzing these dynamics theoretically and empirically is a highly important area for 
future international corporate governance research 
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The second paper in the issue, by Luo and Salterio, examines the interaction of corporate 
governance with firms’ choices of their information disclosure regimes. As the authors note, nearly 
all countries with corporate governance related regulations follow a “comply or explain” approach, 
wherein regulators prescribe a ‘best practices’ code of conduct for public firms; firms must either 
comply with the prescribed practices or explain any deviations thereof (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). 
This approach has wide appeal because it forces a ‘disciplining framework’ on the disclosures of 
governance practices and deviations from norms, allowing outside investors to make more reliable 
assessments of the implications of deviations from non-compliance based on the explanations 
provided by the firm. For the form, however, this regulatory framework presents an interesting trade 
off (see, e.g., Adams et al., 2010). Compliance with the generalized norms and best practices may 
not create value and in fact may impose net costs of maintaining a non-optimal governance 
structure. On the other hand, deviation may also impose costs. In particular, to avoid negative 
investor reaction from non-compliance the firm may have to incur additional monitoring costs.  
There are, of course, two different effects of the “comply and explain” approach. In the good 
outcome, firms can choose a tailored approach and increase value by avoiding unnecessary costs 
and by increasing monitoring. In the bad outcome, firms do not take advantage of the flexibility and 
avoid making serious improvements in governance. Bringing empirical evidence to bear on these 
two possible outcomes is important with obvious implications of corporate governance regulation 
design (the choice between flexible and strictly prescriptive regulation, for example). However, the 
literature is sparse on this issue. Luo and Saltiero develop a unique and innovative approach by 
taking seriously the value-adding potential of “deviate and explain” option. Using the Canadian 
“comply or explain” regime, they construct a novel board score measure based on firms’ posture 
towards 47 ‘best governance practices’ embedded in the Canadian governance regulations. In 
particular, the highest score for each governance dimensions is given to the “explain” option while 
the lowest is given to “non-compliance.” The results are illuminating and thought provoking on 
several fronts. We learn about the governance dimensions that firms are most likely to drop (i.e., be 
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in non-compliance). The authors find a striking significant and positive relation between their 
unique score and firm value; that is, firms that used the “or explain” option were able to create 
value, which is consistent with the positive outcome of the flexible “comply or explain” framework.    
In the third paper, Han et al. examine the role of corporate governance in the information 
transmitted through stock repurchases by firms. Stock repurchases play an increasingly important 
economic role in countries across the world. In the U.S., they have surpassed dividends and in 2013 
represented 60% of cash payouts to shareholders (Economist, 2014). In addition, there have recently 
been conflicts between large activist shareholders and management regarding using cash reserves 
for share repurchases. The basic issue is whether stock purchases are done for benefitting equity 
investors. A well know argument in favor of repurchases is that they signal management’s private 
information on good economic prospects, that is, communicate that share prices are undervalued. 
However, the literature has also raised the possibility of misuse of asymmetric information − the 
false signaling hypothesis (see Baker et al., 2011) − where informed managers use frequent stock 
repurchase to send false signals on undervaluation. However, the literature has not clarified the 
motivation behind frequent stock repurchases. Han et al. posit that deliberate false signaling from 
frequent stock repurchases may reflect agency costs from asymmetric information and hence 
corporate governance may be directly implicated. They use a unique repurchase database from 
South Korea to test this interesting hypothesis. An appealing feature of their data is that Korean 
regulations require managers to choose among a set of possible motivations for stock repurchasing. 
Hence, signaling intent can be more cleanly identified compared with, say, U.S. data where the 
signaling intent has to be inferred and stock repurchases may be connected with other motivations.  
The paper presents a number of novel findings that will move the literature forward. There is 
evidence that frequent stock repurchases reflect false signaling intent. The frequency of stock 
repurchases is related to agency costs in the predicted direction. Moreover, stronger corporate 
governance mitigates the false signaling from stock repurchases that are driven by agency costs. 
Apart from the substantial interest of its results, the study also demonstrates the empirical power of 
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using international data, reflecting a variety of regulatory regimes, that enhances identification and 
helps resolve important issues relating to corporate governance.   
In the final paper, Zhang et al. analyze the moderation or mediating effects of R&D 
investment, the most widely used proxy for technological innovation, between corporate 
governance and firm performance. While the previous literature has examined the mediating effects 
of other firm related variables, such as refocusing strategy or mergers and acquisitions strategy, the 
impact of R&D has not been examined even though innovation is a fundamental driver of value 
creation. Conceptually, this is an important issue because it is not clear whether from the 
perspective of technological innovation corporate governance has direct or indirect effects on firm 
performance? In particular, do corporate governance mechanisms (ownership structure, managerial 
incentive compensation etc.) have indirect effects on performance through their relationship with 
R&D investment? The answer to these questions can improve our understanding of the role played 
by technological innovation on agency costs. Using Data from the Chinese information technology 
(IT) industry, Zhang et al. find that corporate governance mechanisms have indirect effects on firm 
performance through the mediating role of R&D investment. However, their analysis does not 
support the hypothesis that R&D moderates the relation of corporate governance to firm 
performance.     
 
References 
Adams, R., Hermalin, B., &Weisbach, M. 2010. The role of boards of directors in corporate 
governance: A conceptual framework and survey. Journal of Economic Literature, 48: 58–107. 
Aslan, H. & P. Kumar. 2012. Strategic ownership structure and the cost of debt. Review of 
Financial Studies, 25: 2257-2299. 
Aslan, H. & P. Kumar. 2014. National governance bundles and corporate agency costs: A cross-
country analysis. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 22: 230-251.  
6 
 
Baker, H. K., Veit, E. T., & Powell, G. E. 2011. Stock repurchases and false signals. Journal of 
Applied Business Research, 19: 33–46. 
Berle, A. & Means, G. 1932. The modern corporation and private property. MacMillan, New 
York.  
Bhattacharya, S. 1979. Imperfect information, dividend policy, and "the bird in the hand" fallacy. 
Bell Journal of Economics, 10: 259-270. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J.P.H., & Lang, L.H.P. 2002. Disentangling the incentive and 
entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance, 57: 2741–2771. 
Cheung, Y.-L., Rau, P. R., & Stouratis, A. 2006. Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: Evidence 
from connected party transactions in Hong Kong. Journal of Financial Economics, 82: 343–386. 
Dye, R. A. 2001. An evaluation of “essays on disclosure” and the disclosure literature in 
accounting. Journal of Accounting &Economics, 32: 181–235. 
The Economist, September 13, 2014. The repurchase revolution.  
Grossman, S. & Hart, O. 1988. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral 
integration. Journal of Political Economy, 94: 691–719. 
Hart, O. 1995. Firms, contracts, and financial structure. Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press. 
Huyghebaert, N. & Wang, L. 2012. Expropriation of minority investors in Chinese listed firms: The 
role of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 20: 308–332. 
Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305–360. 
Johnson, S., Boone, P., Breach, A., & Friedman, E. 2000. Corporate governance in the Asian 
financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 58: 141–186 
Shan, Y. G. 2013. Can internal governance mechanisms prevent asset appropriation? Examination 
of type I tunneling in China. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21: 225–241. 
7 
 
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 52: 
737–783.  
Vermaelen, T. 1981. Common stock repurchases and market signaling: An empirical study. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 9: 139–183. 
Zattoni, A. and Cuomo, F. 2008. “Why adopt codes of good governance? A comparison of 
institutional and efficiency perspectives”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16 
(1): 1-15. 
 
